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INTERSECTIONALITY AND IDENTITY:
REVISITING A WRINKLE IN TITLE VII
by Bradley Allan Areheart*

INTRODUCTION
In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division,1 a group
of black female employees sued General Motors (“GM”) under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, claiming that GM’s seniority system
was discriminatory towards black women.2 They alleged that the discrimination they encountered as black women was a combination of
race- and sex-based discrimination.3 In other words, the identity for
which they sought protection lay at the intersection of two legally-protected categories: race and sex. The court stated these women were
attempting to “combine statutory remedies” and “create a new ‘superremedy’ that would give them relief beyond what the drafters
intended.”4 Accordingly, the court held that the allegations should be
examined for “race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively
either, but not a combination of both.”5
While the court simply dismissed the race-based claim,6 its treatment of the sex-based claim illuminates potential intersectional claim* Associate, Jenner & Block; J.D. 2005, University of Texas; B.A. 2001, Baylor University.
I am indebted to Professor Wendy Wagner, whose enthusiasm, intellect, and kindness have
inspired me; her mentoring was instrumental in helping me complete the process leading to this
publication. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Karen Engle whose gracious criticism was
exceedingly helpful in revising this Article. Additionally, I would like to thank Seth Belzley,
David Blake, Ezra Church, Michael Heidler, Mathew Titus, Chad Walker, Jonathan Wentz, and
especially John Gore for their comments on earlier drafts. I would like to thank my parents for
their encouragement and my best friend and wife, Robyn, for her unconditional love and support. Above all, I would like to thank my Lord Jesus Christ, without whom I truly can do
nothing.
1 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558
F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
2 Id. at 143.
3 Id.
4 Id
5 Id.
6 The court suggested consolidation of the plaintiffs’ race-based claim with another party’s
claim against GM. Id. at 144–45. Plaintiffs’ counsel unsuccessfully opposed this suggestion by
noting that, unlike the suggested case for consolidation, racial discrimination did not provide the
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ants’ precarious legal position. The evidence adduced at trial
indicated that GM had only begun hiring black women after 1964, the
year of Title VII’s passage.7 Later, due to a recession and GM’s
seniority-based system, all of the black women were laid off.8 The
court reasoned that sex-based discrimination had not taken place
since GM hired white women prior to 1964.9
DeGraffenreid showcased a court’s refusal to “combine two
causes of action into a new special sub-category”—choosing instead to
address each claim separately by applying Title VII’s singular
approach to identity.10 Title VII protects individuals from discriminatory practices based on the following categories: race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.11 The DeGraffenreid decision pinpoints the
dilemma that individuals face when they are forced to bring their suit
under only one protected characteristic. In this case, the court interpreted evidence that GM had hired white women as evidence that GM
had not discriminated against black women; in essence, the employer
disproved the claim of discrimination with evidence that did not correspond to the nature of the claim.12 And even if the DeGraffenreid
court had heard the race-based claim by these black women, the
employer could have disproved it by showing a lack of discrimination
sole basis for this claim. Id. Rather, this claim presented a combination of race- and sex-based
discrimination. Id.
7 Although this point is unclear from the opinion, Kimberlé Crenshaw notes that it came up
in trial. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141.
8 Id.
9 See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 144. Seniority systems, such as this one, only received
this degree of Title VII scrutiny prior to 1977. Up until this point, Title VII broadly extended to
seniority systems that perpetuated past discrimination. In 1977, however, the Supreme Court
dramatically changed directions with International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, the Court decided that “an otherwise neutral, legitimate
seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate
pre-Act discrimination.” Id. at 353–54. This helps to account for the conclusion of DeGraffenreid on appeal. The Eighth Circuit noted that after DeGraffenreid’s submission, the Supreme
Court issued the Teamsters opinion, requiring the court of appeals to sustain the district court’s
judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII claims. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558
F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1977).
10 DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 144.
11 “Or” is the operative word here. As later noted, Title VII does not facially exclude
intersectional claimants. Yet courts have been slow to expand their understanding and analysis
of identity to include anything more than one legally-protected category. The result has been
confusion and general lack of unanimity among the courts.
12 See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 144.
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against black men. The predicament is a Catch-22. Under this view,
black women are only protected to the extent that their experiences
coincide with those of white women or black men.13 Moreover, this
one-dimensional view of discrimination makes it easier for defendants
to prevail over claimants while constraining black women’s and
others’ self-identification.14
In stark contrast to the reasoning in DeGraffenreid, the principle
of intersectionality15 allows legal theorists and practitioners to assess
identity more sensibly and exactly. Intersectionality provides a theoretical framework through which those who suffer “multiple” forms of
discrimination can identify and seek remedies for each of those forms,
instead of forcing them to distill their discrimination into one singular
claim.16 Although intersectionality may seem overly theoretical,
DeGraffenreid illuminates the highly practical approach that intersectionality brings to the dilemma of multi-faceted discrimination. In
that case, the legal void for recognizing intersectional complications in
identity allowed GM to skirt the spirit of Title VII by feigning good
faith. Judicial validation of an intersectional framework would have
potentially averted this dilemma by allowing the DeGraffenreid plaintiffs to use evidence of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and the
combination of both in support of their claims.17
This Article defends the theoretical and practical underpinnings
of intersectionality—a theory that surfaced nearly two decades ago,
but has largely been ignored by the courts since—and advocates for
an amendment to Title VII that would cohere with its original legisla13

Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 143.
The current one-dimensional approach obfuscates the sense of solidarity that comes
from being able to talk about oneself holistically. It is certainly legally relevant if one is black
and/or a woman, but it is also relevant for the social validation of that identity.
15 Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality,” Crenshaw, supra note 7, even
though the notion of “interacting inequalities” had been articulated earlier by other authors.
Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 183, 213 n.118 (1994). See, e.g., Deborah K. King,
Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS
42 (1988); Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, SISTER/OUTSIDER 114 (1984).
16 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285,
308–09 (2001).
17 The combination of racial and sexual discrimination strikes at the claim these plaintiffs
attempted to make—that GM had not merely discriminated against women or blacks, but black
women.
14
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tive intent. Part I situates intersectionality among feminist and critical
scholarship, specifically noting the theory’s natural emergence from
developments in the realm of civil rights. Part II traces the development of intersectionality within the courts by examining the types of
cases in which the theory has arisen and the confusion over how intersectional plaintiffs’ claims may be reconciled with existing law.
Finally, Part III advocates that Congress amend Title VII to clarify the
statute and explicitly authorize claimants to proceed under more than
one legally-protected category.
As a general matter, the theory of intersectionality “is not being
offered here as some new, totalizing theory of identity.”18 Limitations
in scope are inevitable. Accordingly, this Article primarily examines
the situation of black women, largely because they introduced and
popularized intersectionality. Additionally, most court cases that
have dealt with intersectionality have involved black women. This
focus on black women is not intended to be exclusionary, but illustrative, “highlight[ing] the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed.”19 Indeed,
the emphasis on the interconnectedness of race and sex neither discounts the relevance of other intersections and the efforts made to
examine them,20 nor does it provide a limiting function for selfinvention.21
I.

SITUATING INTERSECTIONALITY

IN

CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS

Almost immediately following the inception of civil rights movements, black women found themselves in a sociopolitical lurch. Afri18 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
19 Id. at 1245.
20 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that the
work of Critical Race Theory scholars who do not perform a “multidimensional” analysis perpetuates heterosexism and the marginalization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people
of color).
21 This Article focuses on race and sex due to the historical significance of these two
descriptors in America in locating identity in time and space. Specifically, black women have a
distinct legacy of oppression in America. From their experience as slaves, (which was “harsher,
more brutal than that of the black male slave”) to black male sexism, to the racism within the
recent women’s movement, black women have experienced an unending tide of mistreatment.
BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 43 (1981). Though beyond the
scope of this Article, there is a very legitimate need to push for additional statutory protection,
particularly in the area of sexual orientation.
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can-American forums and feminist movements provided the most
seemingly accessible options for voicing their demands. Unfortunately, the conditions upon which full group membership to these
movements were based—“[w]hiteness for feminist thought, maleness
for [b]lack social and political thought”—systematically excluded
black women from gaining a voice in groups intended to achieve
equality.22 Both feminists and those seeking racial equality feared
that advancing the cause of black women would compromise the focus
of their own respective messages.23
For feminist movements, resistance to the cause of black women
took form in the 1960s with the general tendency to defend a unitary
female subject.24 This wave of feminism encompassed equality theory,
difference theory, and dominance theory.25 Each of these theories
presented a singular conception of what it meant to be a woman.26
Moreover, some of the theorists from this time period presented their
messages as the singular and correct conception of the female condition.27 Accordingly, feminist movements downplayed complexity and
contradiction to emphasize their messages.28
Feminist movements also frequently compared the plight of
“women” to that of “blacks,” further underscoring a “sexist-racist attitude” that perpetuated the exclusion of women of color.29 These sexrace comparisons were well established in American feminism by the
early 1960s30 and adherents continued to employ them as part of a
general feminist legal strategy.31 This type of analogy—stressing the
parallel, rather than intersectional or overlapping nature of discrimi22

PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 12 (1991).
Id.
Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2482

AND THE

23
24

(1994).
25

Id. at 2482–83.
Id. Abrams observed these theorists’ opposition to “the construction of a complex subjectivity.” Id. at 2483.
27 Id. at 2482–83.
28 Id. at 2482.
29 Serena Mayeri, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal
and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1045 (2001) (citing HOOKS, supra note 21, at 8,
140–41). See also King, supra note 15, at 43–46; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 119–25 (1988).
30 Mayeri, supra note 29, at 1052 (“Since the genesis of the antebellum woman’s movement
in Garrisonian abolitionism, parallels between racial and sexual subordination appeared intermittently in the service of feminist legal causes from marriage reform to suffrage.”).
31 Id. at 1055–56, 1081–86.
26
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nation—obscured the experiences of individuals who were both
female and black.32 By failing to acknowledge the overlapping nature
of identity in the case of black women, such feminist reasoning suggested that by “women” they meant “white women” and by “blacks”
they meant “black men.”33
Consequently, the feminist strategies employed in the 1960s
excluded women of color.34 Similarly, many members of the contemporary feminist movement have refused to appropriate black women’s
claims to ensure their ability to project themselves as victims of sex
discrimination.35 Implicit in this strategy is the idea that drawing
attention to race displaces the focus on sexism. As a result, the feminist movement has dialogued for decades in a distinctively “white”
fashion.36
Anti-racism movements also left black women disappointed. The
basic assumption that black men should lead these movements
entrenched sexism amidst black men and black women.37 Just as feminist movements were reluctant to acknowledge any oppression other
than sexism, anti-racism groups were “unwilling to acknowledge black
male sexist oppression of black women because they [did] not want to
acknowledge that racism [was] not the only oppressive force.”38 Consequently, these movements positively impacted the struggle against
racism, but failed to examine the workings of sexist oppression.39
From the foregoing, it is clear that anti-racism and feminist
groups each advanced discrete goals. These groups’ discourses
depicted men of color as the quintessential targets of race discrimination, while portraying white women as the classic sex discrimination
victims.40 Moreover, by failing to recognize commonality where it
32

Id. at 1049.
HOOKS, supra note 21, at 8.
34 More than exclusion, these strategies marginalized women of color. “[T]he unity that
characterized accounts of women as a group had been achieved through the erasure or marginalization of the lives of less privileged women.” Abrams, supra note 24, at 2486.
35 HOOKS, supra note 21, at 145.
36 Id. at 149; Abrams, supra note 24, at 2486 (observing how mainstream feminist theorists
“characterized the perspectives of a privileged subset of women—those who were white,
straight, and middle class—as the vantage point of women”).
37 HOOKS, supra note 21, at 88–89.
38 Id. at 88.
39 Id. at 117.
40 Mayeri, supra note 29, at 1050. See generally Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS.
L. REV. 539; Crenshaw, supra note 7; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
33
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existed, these groups unwittingly stymied alliances to resist together a
social and legal system that enshrines white male privilege.41 Both
groups helped shape a civil rights landscape in which the unique concerns of black women were ignored.42
Around 1980, early critical legal theorists began to interrogate
law by focusing on equality and specific facets of identity that traditional legal analysis disregarded. These scholars focused on subjects
such as race, class, and sexuality.43 Derrick Bell criticized traditional
legal scholars’ tendency to ignore race, permitting social justice only
when African-Americans’ interests converged with the interests of a
white majority.44 Bernadette Chachere highlighted class as a significant barrier to reaching the civil rights ideals embodied in the Constitution, its preamble, and the Bill of Rights.45 Rhonda Rivera
emphasized the need to focus on sexuality to address the treatment of
homosexuality in America’s judicial system.46 Each of these theorists
focused on a single characteristic for understanding identity. It was
not until the emergence of anti-essentialist47 theorists—most notably,
intersectional scholars—that these singular conceptions of identity
were shattered.
Intersectionality emerged largely as a response to “the concrete
and conceptual omissions of equality theories advanced in the
41 See infra Part II.C (explaining how Title VII tacitly affirms the status of the American
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male and provides recourse that is of the greatest benefit to those
who most closely resemble this norm).
42 Abrams, supra note 24, at 2488.
43 See Nancy Levit, Introduction: Theorizing the Connections Among Systems of Subordination, 71 UMKC L. REV. 227, 227 (2002) (observing that “[t]he first anti-subordination writings
simply tried to obtain recognition for identity categories as important subjects of inquiry”).
44 Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 522 (1980).
45 See Bernadette Chachere, Welfare and Poverty as Roadblocks to the Civil Rights Goals of
the 1980’s, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 789, 789–90 (1985) (concluding that aspirations for civil rights
advances will continue to be significantly impaired by socioeconomic disadvantage).
46 See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
47 “Essentialism” assumes that the experience of being a particular member of a particular
group is stable—“one with a clear meaning, a meaning constant through time, space, and historical, social, political, and personal contexts.” Trino Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality:
Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 19 (1995); KATHARINE
T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 871–72 (1993) (describing the issue of essentialism as one of false universalism, “overgeneralizations or unstated reference points [that] implicitly attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of individuals
who are dominant in that group”). Anti-essentialist theorists challenged traditional feminist theory and its unitary characterizations of women.
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1980s.”48 By concentrating on specific facets of identity—such as race,
class, and sexuality—many of these equality theorists neglected the
overall complexity of human identity.49 Kimberlé Crenshaw and other
early intersectional theorists sought to reformulate the self as both
“constituted and fragmented” by the intersections of various identity
categories.50 In this context, a person’s identity was comprised of
much more than simply a race, class, or sex. Indeed, thinking of these
facets of identity as discrete and separable had been artificially limiting; rightly considered, a person’s identity includes characteristics of
sex, race, and socioeconomic standing. In addition, there are many
other alternative and salient ways of identifying oneself. Armed with
the recognition that “we all stand at multiple intersections of our fragmented legal selves,”51 intersectional theorists revolutionized legal
identity and how it ought to be understood and discussed.
Central to its revolutionary nature, intersectionality represented
a clear departure from feminist and anti-racism movements. In addition, intersectionality went further than equality theorists’ focus on
particular facets of identity that legal analysis previously neglected.
These prior attempts to understand identity failed to differentiate
carefully enough among the myriad prejudices that individuals face.
To analogize, feminist and equality theorists metaphorically envisioned the “self” as a tennis ball; it had a uniform shape and contours,
with very minor depressions and lines. In contrast, the intersectional
conception of the self is like a Koosh ball:
The Koosh ball is a popular children’s toy. Although it is called a ball
and that category leads one to imagine a firm, round surface used for
48 Eaton, supra note 15, at 212. As one other critical scholar notes, this postmodern emergence “sounded the death knell for [a unitary, stable, and transparent] concept of the self.” John
A. Powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (1997).
49 See Levit, supra note 43, at 227 (noting concerns that equality theorists inadvertently
reduced “identity group members to monolithic essences”). See also supra notes 43–46 and
accompanying text.
50 Powell, supra note 48, at 1483.
51 Grillo, supra note 47, at 18. This naturally leads to the further recognition of “hybrid
intersectionality,” where an individual will play the role of oppressor (drawing on their dominant
identity status) in some contexts and the oppressed (via membership in a subordinate group) in
others. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 275 (2002). For example, a black
female, despite encountering sexual and racial subordination, may well find herself in a dominant position because of her heterosexuality or high income.
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catching and throwing, the Koosh ball is neither hard nor firm. Picture hundreds of rubber bands, tied in the center. Mentally cut the
end of each band. The wriggling, unfirm mass in your hand is a Koosh
ball, still usable for throwing and catching, but changing shape as it
sails through the air or as the wind blows through its rubbery limbs
when it is at rest. It is a dynamic ball.52

Bringing feminists and equality theorists into the analogy, they identified a particular strand of the Koosh ball, saying in essence, “See this
strand, this is defining and central. It matters.”53 In contrast, intersectional theorists conceded the importance of these individual strands,
but disputed the claim that one strand can or should be seen as defining and central. For example, it mattered that a person was black, but
it also mattered that she was a woman, from Nigeria, and a lesbian.
II. TITLE VII

AND

INTERSECTIONALITY

Intersectionality has particular salience for antidiscrimination law
where individuals are forced to self-identify using established legal
categories to situate their claim. In particular, Title VII protects individuals from discriminatory employment practices based on “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”54 A successful Title VII claim
requires that the plaintiff satisfy the four-part test articulated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.55 In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s prima facie case for employment
discrimination consists of showing: 1) the plaintiff belongs to one of
the protected classes; 2) the plaintiff was qualified and applied for a
job for which the employer sought applicants; 3) the plaintiff was
rejected despite being qualified; and 4) the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek other applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications after the plaintiff’s rejection.56 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
52 Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of
Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 899 (1995).
53 Id.
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2000). This bar against discrimination extends to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
55 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56 Id. at 802.
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decision.57 At this point, an employer may submit affirmative evidence of nondiscrimination—in the form of statistics, for example.58
The plaintiff may then show that the employer’s proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for a discriminatory motive
based on one of the protected classes.59
A. Legislative History
Much of the confusion for intersectionality centers around Congress’s use of the word “or” in the text of Title VII, which protects
against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.60 Some courts have argued the term is additive, enabling a
plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit under more than one protected category.61 Other courts have read the term exclusively, meaning that a
plaintiff must choose only one of the listed, protected traits.62 As a
result, many commentators have noted that the problem with Title
VII is its emphasis on singular identity and the difficulty it presents for
plaintiffs with multiple or overlapping claims.63 Although it is not
expressly prohibited in the statute, courts have been reluctant to allow
plaintiffs to aggregate evidence of discrimination when it encompasses
more than one legally-protected category.64
57

Id.
As noted later, this type of evidence is often not meaningful for intersectional plaintiffs.
See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
59 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2000).
61 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir.
1980) (arguing “[t]he use of the word ‘or’ evidences Congress’s intent to prohibit employment
discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics”).
62 See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo.
1976) (holding that “this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race
discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both”).
63 See Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159 (1993) (noting
that Title VII’s problem is the rigidly categorical framework within which individuals must work
to advance their claims); Grillo, supra note 47, at 16–17 (noting that in legal analysis, each of the
categories or characteristics are thought of separately, as though they exist suspended in time
and space); Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender, and
National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 776 (1996).
64 See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143; Chaddah v. Harris Bank Glencoe-Northbrook,
N.A., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1994), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir.
1994) (bifurcating plaintiff’s claims of discrimination to disprove them); Clay v. BPS Guard
Servs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1993) (disaggregating plaintiff’s
evidence of race and sex discrimination, opining that such evidence is contradictory, and dis58
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When arguing about Title VII’s legislative intent, intersectional
advocates have emphasized that an amendment to add the word
“solely”—thereby proscribing discrimination based solely on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin—actually came up during the
debates.65 Representative John Dowdy introduced this amendment,
noting “[s]urely this is what is intended and it is only reasonable that
the matter be clearly stated in the language of the bill.”66 Significantly, Congress did not incorporate the “solely” language into the
final statute. Some courts have read this legislative history as validation for a “sex-plus” rationale, whereby an individual’s claim is considered under the protected category of sex, “plus” one other
(subsidiary) protected trait.67 Other courts have viewed the result
more broadly, positing it as evidence for Congress’s intention that
Title VII not merely proscribe discrimination based on one of the protected traits.68 In short, Title VII’s legislative history does not provide
an established policy for dealing with intersectional claimants.69
B. Loopholes
One consequence of forcing a plaintiff to choose only one claim
under Title VII is that it provides employers with a loophole through
which they can avoid the law. One case that is illustrative—in addition to DeGraffenreid—is Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc.70 In
Moore, the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision not to certify the black
female plaintiff as the class representative in a sex discrimination complaint on behalf of all women at Hughes.71 The Moore court failed to
see the similarity between a black woman and other women, observing that “Moore had never claimed before the [Equal Employment
missing altogether the sex discrimination claim); Lee v. Walters, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11336, at
*20–*21 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1988) (disaggregating plaintiff’s claims of race and sex discrimination
to construe successful white women and men of color as disproof).
65 Cathy Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women’s Employment Experiences, 98 YALE
L.J. 1457, 1466–67 (1989) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2721, 2728 (1964) and discussing aspects of the
congressional debate over Title VII that are pertinent to the intersectional claimant).
66 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964).
67 Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975). For a greater explanation of sex-plus case doctrine, see infra Part II.E.
68 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964)).
69 Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1467.
70 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
71 Id. at 480.
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Opportunity Commission] that she was discriminated against as a
female, but only as a black female.”72 Accordingly, the court refused
to certify the plaintiff as the class action representative, even though
the class included black women.73
Presumably on the basis of Moore claiming discrimination as a
black woman, the court left her to support her claim with statistical
evidence of discrimination against black women.74 The court found
Moore to be the only qualified black woman employee in her particular unit,75 thereby leaving her with no statistically significant evidence
to prove a claim of discrimination against black women. Thus, the
Moore court placed black women—a group already “multiply-burdened”76 by their race and sex—at a further disadvantage for remedying their claims. Disaggregating the race and sex claims would have
posed its own problems as Hughes could have shown that no discrimination took place against women by identifying white females who
worked for the plant. Similarly, Hughes could have rebutted racial
discrimination by pointing to the presence of black men. This intersectional loophole often exists in employment discrimination cases.77
72

Id. (emphasis added).
The issue of whether courts ought to certify a black woman in a class constituted
predominantly by white women is beyond the scope of this Article. Though at least one scholar
has criticized courts for failing to certify black women in such class actions, see Crenshaw, supra
note 7, at 144–48, it appears to the author that class actions raise unique concerns of efficiency
and—with regard to selecting a class representative—homogeneity.
74 See id. at 484–86 (tracing the plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempts to produce statistically
significant evidence of discrimination toward black women). Moore was brought under a disparate impact theory, which requires that plaintiffs show statistically significant evidence of discrimination. Id. at 478. The disparate impact theory of recovery under Title VII is used to
attack employment practices that are “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). According to Moore, as long as the employer had not
overtly discriminated against black women (and the plaintiffs were forced to look at the effects
of neutral policies under a disparate impact theory), it was “home free” since there were no
statistically significant numbers of qualified, black women at Hughes. Moore, 708 F.2d at 484.
The disparate impact dilemma is especially salient for intersectionality since its claimants are, by
definition, less represented than other groups. For example, women are by definition a larger
class than black women or Asian women. Thus, for these potential intersectional claimants it
will necessarily be more difficult to have the statistically significant numbers needed to prove a
disparate impact claim.
75 Moore, 708 F.2d at 484.
76 Multiply-burdened is purposefully used here, rather than “doubly-burdened,” since the
latter designation obscures the oppression groups at a particular intersection face as merely additive. See infra notes 171–77 and accompanying text.
77 As further example, see discussion of Lee v. Walters, infra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
73
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The court concluded that “Moore [was] relying on little more than an
inference of discrimination from the bare absence of black female
employees.”78
C. Privilege
When courts interpret Title VII as only allowing suits brought
under solely race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the statute
tacitly affirms the privilege of the American white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male79 by providing a remedy only for those claimants who
deviate from this prototype in one respect.80 Crenshaw depicts this
point visually with her metaphor of a basement that contains all people who are discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical ability.81 The people in this
basement are stacked—one person’s feet on top of another’s shoulders—from the bottom to the top.82 Those at the bottom of the basement are individuals fully disadvantaged by the broad array of factors,
while those at the top (near the ceiling) are disadvantaged by only a
single factor.83 She notes that this ceiling is also a floor, above which
all those who are not disadvantaged by any factor reside.84
78

Moore, 708 F.2d at 484.
John Powell, in the context of discrimination law, similarly describes the need to consider
“the marks of privilege” which he lists off as “male, White, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual,
and middle class.” Powell, supra note 48, at 1512. See also Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 107 (1994);
Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 151 (arguing that “the paradigm of sex discrimination tends to be
based on the experiences of white women [and that] the model of race discrimination tends to be
based on the experiences of the most privileged Blacks”). A body of knowledge that is relevant
to this phenomenon is Critical White Studies. Barbara Flagg has contributed greatly to this
movement by arguing that a critical feature of white identity is transparency: “the tendency of
whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that
are white-specific.” Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
80 Title VII protects whites even though they were not the intended beneficiaries of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976).
However, these claims are not usually as persuasive. Moreover, it is typically unnecessary for a
person possessing the privileged white race status to specify race in a discrimination claim
because race will not usually play a role in the discrimination this person experienced. Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 144–45. This same line of reasoning has similar applicability to the male
sex, the Christian religion, and the European-American national origin.
81 Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 151.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
79
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A hatch is now developed through which those whose heads are
touching the ceiling can quickly crawl.85 One might aptly consider
Title VII as the hatch. The dilemma is that the hatch is only available
to those directly below it.86 The multiply-removed persons87 at the
bottom of the basement remain in the basement unless they can pull
themselves into one of the singly-burdened groups above that are permitted to squeeze through the hatch.88
Continuing the metaphor, the American black Protestant male
and the American white Protestant female are standing near the top
of the ceiling. They are able to bring their claims under a singular
departure from the legally-established norm of the American white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant male.89 However, imagine the African black
Hindu female who experiences discrimination in her employment.
She deviates from the privileged norm in every way possible. Is it fair
to essentialize her discrimination as only race- or sex-based? Is it reasonable to assume that her oppression was only because of her
national origin or religion? Such inclinations to singularly identify
bias fail to address the complexity of identity and concomitant subordination. As Crenshaw explains:
[P]roviding legal relief only when Black women show that their claims
are based on race or on sex is analogous to calling an ambulance for
the victim only after the driver responsible for the injuries is identified. But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes
the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred
simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine which driver caused
the harm. In these cases the tendency seems to be that no driver is
held responsible, no treatment is administered, and the involved parties simply get back in their cars and zoom away.90
85

Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 152.
87 That is, those who are multiply-removed from the American white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male norm.
88 Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 152.
89 Powell has argued that much of the language in intersectionality analysis subtly contributes to “normalizing . . . the white male, the unstated marker of the dominant discourse.” Powell, supra note 48, at 1493. However, the law’s dependence on a single-axis approach to
antidiscrimination is more aptly seen as enshrining the white male as the standard from which
deviation is measured.
90 Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 149.
86
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This metaphor illuminates the extreme difficulty of disaggregating
identity for the purpose of bringing a legal claim. Yet according to
Crenshaw’s metaphor and a number of court decisions,91 the only way
for a multiply-burdened person to obtain legal relief is to isolate and
disaggregate the legally-protected characteristics that form the basis
of her claim.
Another way of discussing Title VII’s emphasis on privilege is via
the observation that courts and commentators have usually limited the
examination of race and sex discrimination to the experiences of the
otherwise-privileged members of the group.92 This means that “in
race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms
of sex- or class-privileged blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus
is on race- and class-privileged women.”93 The implication is that
racism and sexism become obfuscated by focusing on a group that is
actually only “a subset of a much more complex phenomenon.”94
Wilson v. Bailey 95 exemplifies how privilege constricts the analysis of identity. In Wilson, two deputy sheriffs, both white males,
brought suit under Title VII claiming reverse discrimination at the
hands of the Birmingham, Alabama affirmative action program.96
They claimed “a higher proportion of minorities and women were
promoted than white men.”97 Despite the fact that this claim was
intersectional in nature—these white men were not claiming discrimination had occurred on the sole basis of being either white or male—
the court did not require the claim be brought under only race or sex.
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit considered the claim holistically,
allowing statistics of any male or white candidates to be utilized as
evidence in support of their claim.98 One would suppose that this
treatment is a privilege of being part of the white male norm.99 As
Crenshaw noted in her groundbreaking article on intersectionality in
1989, she was unable to discover any case in which courts had pre91

See supra note 64.
Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 140.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
96 Id. at 303.
97 Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
98 See id.
99 To be fair, this type of treatment is also likely because white men are usually a more
statistically significant and common sub-group. Accordingly, proxies for measuring this type of
discrimination are not usually necessary.
92
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vented white men from bringing a reverse discrimination claim merely
because of the claim’s intersectional nature.100 This point is significant
because a reverse discrimination claim by white males clearly lies at
the intersection of race and sex. A double standard appears to exist,
whereby white male (intersectional) litigants enjoy additional legal
protections which do not extend to non-white male intersectional
claimants. This is a repugnant and unacceptable reality.
D. Intersectional Discrimination
Though DeGraffenreid first addressed intersectional experiences
over thirty years ago, concerns over intersectional claims remain pertinent and timely.101 Despite a number of court decisions that have validated intersectional claims,102 none of these decisions have generated
enough publicity or been handed down by a court with sufficient
authority to set a genuine precedent in an area lacking clear guidance.103 The closest the U.S. Supreme Court has come to addressing
the intersectional dilemma is its approving citation to Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n. 104 Unfortunately, the reference
was made in passing and lacked any analysis.105
Despite some recent intersectional successes, many courts have
refused to abandon a single-factor analysis with respect to intersectional claims. In Lee v. Walters,106 the plaintiff, an Asian-American
100

Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 142 n.12.
While the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, they did so on different
grounds and noted that they did “not subscribe entirely to the district court’s reasoning in
rejecting appellants’ claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII.” DeGraffenreid v.
Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1977).
102 Nagar v. Found. Health Sys., 57 Fed. App’x 304 (9th Cir. 2003); Lam v. Univ. of Haw.,
40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Core-Boykin v. Boston Edison Co., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 128
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2004); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D. Md. 2003).
103 There remains a lack of consensus among courts on how to decide cases with multiple
claims. See Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Commentary: After Intersectionality,
71 UMKC L. REV. 485, 485 (2002) (“putting [intersectionality] to work in law . . . has proven to
be quite difficult”); Abrams, supra note 24, at 2496 (observing that intersectional cases have not
produced a durable precedent that would secure judicial recognition of intersectional claims);
Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 302–03. Finally, no cases have offered a framework that would
allow more than two claims to be brought. See Levit, supra note 43, at 229 (“no decisions have
acknowledged the intersection of more than two bases for discrimination”).
104 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
105 See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 598 n.10 (1999) (citing Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032)
(“[d]iscrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against
black men or white women”).
106 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11336, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1988).
101
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female doctor, claimed that discrimination accounted for 1) her failure
to obtain a promotion and 2) an unfair work-related reprimand.107 In
particular, she claimed the discrimination she encountered was based
on race, sex, and national origin.108 The court’s comments in a footnote addressing the claims of race and sex discrimination are telling:
“There is no direct evidence of anti-female or anti-[A]sian animus.
Moreover, there were [white] females and [A]sian[ ] [men] in chief
grade positions and on the Professional Standards Board.”109 Just like
DeGraffenreid, the Lee court refused to accept a woman of color’s
claims of race and sex discrimination by separately construing successful white women and men of color as disproof.110
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois took a
similar approach in Chaddah v. Harris Bank Glencoe-Northbrook,
N.A. 111 In that case, the plaintiff, an Asian woman, alleged that she
was constructively discharged and denied opportunities for promotion
at her bank.112 In her amended complaint, Chaddah claimed she
experienced discrimination based on her age and race and that it was
the “pattern and practice” of the business.113 Once again, the court
bifurcated the claims so that they became irrelevant for proving discrimination against an older Asian woman. The court noted that the
plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the younger, white women
promoted ahead of her were less qualified or that “there were few or
no Asian or older bank officers.”114
107

Id. at *1, *5, *9.
Id. at *1.
109 Id. at *21 n.7.
110 Although the court found for the plaintiff on her lack of promotion claim (on the basis
of national origin), the court refused to find that the reprimand was a pretext for unlawful discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Id. at *20–21, *24. But see Graham v. Bendix Corp.,
585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black woman is
protected against discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an employer who
singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat plaintiff’s case by showing
that white females or black males are not so unfavorably treated.”); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 946 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986).
111 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1994), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994).
112 Id. at *4–*7.
113 Id. at *16–*17 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977))
(noting that a plaintiff must prove “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ or
sporadic discriminatory acts” for a pattern and practice claim of discrimination). The Teamsters
Court observed that the plaintiff must prove the “discrimination was the company’s standard
operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
114 Chaddah, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693, at *17.
108
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Lee and Chaddah each illustrate the dilemma an intersectional
claimant faces. Such a plaintiff will often be compelled to identify the
treatment of other groups that are statistically significant for the purposes of proving her claim, such as “women” or “older individuals.”
In the case of black women, this process might involve looking at how
black men and white women are treated.115 Yet, in considering evidence of such groups, the intersectional plaintiff utilizes proof that
may not capture the essence of her claim. For example, in Chaddah,
the issue was not that the bank discriminated against women or
Asians or older individuals. The issue was that the bank discriminated
against Chaddah, an older Asian woman.
These cases are examples of courts failing to provide redress
through rough proxies. However, evidence regarding the treatment of
groups that share only one trait with the intersectional claimant is pertinent only as evidence of discrimination—and not pertinent as evidence of nondiscrimination. In other words, evidence regarding the
treatment of such groups is only helpful for identifying discriminatory
animus and not helpful for illuminating the defendant’s good motives;
the evidence does not work both ways. For example, in Jefferies,116
the Fifth Circuit held that evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment of
black males and white females was wholly unrelated to the question of
discriminatory treatment toward a black woman claiming bias on both
racial and sexual grounds.117 Conversely, evidence of discriminatory
treatment (by the defendant) of a black male is clearly relevant to the
discrimination claim of a black woman.118 Accordingly, evidence of
nondiscriminatory treatment toward a group that shares only one trait
with the intersectional claimant does not exculpate the defendant.
However, evidence of discrimination toward such a group may well be
evidence that rightfully indicts a defendant’s motives. The distinction
is critical.
Another federal circuit court case that provides much of the analysis needed for intersectional claimants is Lam v. University of
115 But see supra Part II.B. (explaining how this evidentiary method should not, but may,
provide the employer with a loophole for avoiding Title VII regulation).
116 Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
117 Id. at 1034; See Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984). At a
minimum, it is clear that favorable treatment of one member of a protected class does not preclude the possibility that another member of the same class suffered discrimination. Lam v.
Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 (9th Cir. 1994).
118 Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562 n.18 (citing EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1072
(11th Cir. 1990)).
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Hawaii.119 In Lam, a Vietnamese woman applied for a position as
Director of the Pacific Asian Legal Studies Program at the University
of Hawaii Law School.120 The school completed two separate searches
for applicants, but rejected Lam each time.121 Lam filed suit, asserting
the university had discriminated against her on the bases of race, sex,
and national origin.122 The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendant regarding both searches and posited two principal
rationales.123 First, it found no direct evidence of faculty prejudice on
the hiring committee.124 Second, the court identified indirect evidence
of nondiscrimination by noting the defendant’s favorable consideration of two other candidates for the position: an Asian man and a
white woman.125 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion is
worth quoting at length:
In assessing the significance of these candidates, the [district] court
seemed to view racism and sexism as separate and distinct elements
amenable to almost mathematical treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an Asian woman became a simple matter of performing
two separate tasks: looking for racism “alone” and looking for sexism
“alone,” with Asian men and white women as the corresponding
model victims. The court questioned Lam’s claim of racism in light of
the fact that the Dean had been interested in the late application of an
Asian male. Similarly, it concluded that the faculty’s subsequent offer
of employment to a white woman indicated a lack of gender bias. We
conclude that in relying on these facts as a basis for its summary judgment decision, the district court misconceived important legal principles. . . . [W]here two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be
neatly reduced to distinct components. Rather than aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bisect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature
of their experiences.126
119

40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1554.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Lam, 40 F.3d at 1560.
125 Id. at 1561.
126 Id. at 1561–62 (emphasis added). The court of appeals shrewdly noted that Lam and the
Asian male candidate were of different national origins, thereby making the racial similarity
irrelevant. Id. at 1516 n.16. Regarding the female candidate who received an offer, the court
120
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The Ninth Circuit lucidly demonstrated that mathematical treatment of discrimination may yield nonsensical results. It noted that the
district court’s approach equated discrimination against Asian women
to discrimination against Asian men + discrimination against white
women.127 As an example of the inherent fallacy in this type of formulaic treatment, the court noted that discrimination against white
men could be analyzed using the following similar mathematical
model: Asian men + white women.128
Other recent decisions have followed Lam’s holding.129 In Jeffers
v. Thompson,130 the plaintiff sued on the basis of more than one
legally-protected category under Title VII.131 The court affirmed the
plaintiff’s ability to do so, noting that “[s]ome characteristics, such as
race, color, and national origin, often fuse inextricably. Made flesh in
a person, they indivisibly intermingle.”132 The Jeffers court acknowledged that intersectional claimants have often been the victims of distinct stereotypes and “that discrimination against African-American
women necessarily combines (even if it cannot be dichotomized into)
discrimination against African-Americans and discrimination against
women.”133
E. Sex-Plus Cases
Some courts have recognized a “sex-plus” rationale, whereby a
characteristic in addition to sex is given consideration as a subsidiary
observed that the school offered her the position long after Lam had complained of discrimination by filing the present discrimination action. Id. at 1516 n.17. Given the law school’s obvious
incentive to shield itself from liability by taking corrective action, this seemingly nondiscriminatory act of hiring a woman was not considered relevant. Id.
127 Id. at 1562 n.19.
128 Id.
129 See Nagar v. Found. Health Sys., 57 Fed. App’x 304, 306 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming that
discrimination on a combination of factors is impermissible); Core-Boykin v. Boston Edison Co.,
2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 128, *1, *24 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2004) (affirming combination
discrimination); Fucci v. Graduate Hosp., 969 F. Supp. 310, 316 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (observing
that a Title VII claim may be premised on alleged discrimination based on a combination of
impermissible factors). See also Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d
364, 374 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming intersectional standing tacitly for the black female plaintiff by
comparing the case to Jefferies).
130 264 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D. Md. 2003).
131 Id. at 325.
132 Id. at 326.
133 Id.
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trait. The dissent in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.134 established
this theory. In Phillips, a female plaintiff filed a sex discrimination
action after she was told the employer was not accepting applications
from women with pre-school age children.135 The same employer had
hired men with pre-school age children.136 Yet because Martin Marietta’s workforce contained a strong proportion of women—notwithstanding the consideration of children—the district court determined
that no question of bias was presented, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.137
In his dissent, Judge Brown vehemently disagreed with the
court’s refusal to examine the “coalescence” of sex and motherhood.138 Judge Brown argued that the employer in Phillips discriminated on the basis of sex because motherhood is a condition
intrinsically related to women.139 He reasoned that if discrimination
were permitted in cases where it is conspicuously tied to a sex-related
factor (such as motherhood), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be
dead.140 On review, the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the
case to determine whether refusing applications from women with
pre-school age children was a bona fide occupational qualification
necessary to the defendant’s enterprise.141
134 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1258–59 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J.,
dissenting). Judge Brown found motherhood was a ruse for discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id. at 1259.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1260.
138 Id.
139 Judge Brown explained:
The distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The question then
arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query the answer is just as simple: Nobody—and
this includes Judges, Solomonic or life tenured—has yet seen a male mother. A mother,
to oversimplify the simplest biology, must then be a woman.
Id. at 1259.
140 Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1260. Judge Brown noted that if the court were free to discriminate
as to non-statutory factors that correlated strongly with sex, “the rankest sort of discrimination
against women [could] be worked by employers.” Id. He noted this discrimination could be
directed at all kinds of physical characteristics that have a correlation with sex—such as minimum weight, minimum shoulder width, and minimum lifting capacity. Id. This claim occurred
before the doctrine of disparate impact emerged from Title VII, under which employers are
prohibited from instituting facially neutral hiring, promotion, and firing policies that have a disparate impact on any protected class. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
141 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
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Since Phillips, intersectionality has occasionally found solace
through the sex-plus rationale. In 1980, the Fifth Circuit weighed in
shortly after DeGraffenreid with an unflinching opinion in Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Ass’n.142 The court held that black
women constituted a protected sub-class under Title VII and acknowledged “[d]iscrimination against black females can exist even in the
absence of discrimination against black men or white women.”143 The
court adopted a sex-plus approach144 and, similar to Phillips, argued
that Title VII should not be diluted even though the discrimination in
question affected only a portion of women.145 To neglect the unique
posture of black women, the court reasoned, would leave them without a viable Title VII remedy.146
The Fifth Circuit initially addressed Jefferies’ race and sex discrimination claims separately. Ultimately, however, the court
examined her claim as that of a woman who, due to a secondary/subsidiary, protected trait, encountered discrimination. The court framed
its decision in terms of the validity of sex-plus cases and their efficacy
in preventing a group of women from being singled out and discriminated against.147 Yet in holding that black women were protected
under sex-plus reasoning, the Fifth Circuit seemed to imply that black
women’s claims did not constitute “standard” sex discrimination.148
142 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980). As briefly noted earlier, the court’s careful attention
to the legislative record helped direct its decision. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress’s use
of the word or in the language of Title VII (protecting on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex
or national origin”) demonstrated Congress’s intent to prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of any or all of these protected characteristics. Id. The court also noted that the House
of Representatives refused an amendment that would have added the word “solely” to clarify
that a plaintiff could only bring her case under one protected characteristic. Id. (citing 110
CONG. REC. 2728 (1964)).
143 Id.
144 Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1471 (noting “Jefferies has had an impact on other
courts, which have subsequently adopted the sex-plus rational [sic] as a framework for understanding Black women”). One scholar believes that the Jefferies court analyzed discrimination
against black women through this lens because it was able to rationalize its decision by applying
an already established theory. Id. at 1470. Accordingly, the Jefferies court noted its decision was
“mandated by the holdings of the Supreme Court and this court in the ‘sex plus’ cases.” Jefferies,
615 F.2d at 1033.
145 Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)).
146 Id. at 1032–33.
147 See id. at 1033–34.
148 Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 143 n.13. The implication is that “standard” sex discrimination is discrimination against white women. See supra notes 92–94 (noting how sex discrimina-
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A few years later, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in Judge v. Marsh 149 criticized the Jefferies decision as too
far-reaching.150 The court noted that the Jefferies rationale of
extending sex-plus analysis to protect on the basis of race turned
employment discrimination into a many-headed Hydra since Title VII
already protected race.151 The Marsh court worried that “[f]ollowing
the Jeffries [sic] rationale to its extreme, protected subgroups would
exist for every possible combination of race, color, sex, national origin
and religion.”152 In response to this fear, the court restricted the Jefferies analysis to employment decisions based on one protected,
immutable trait, directed against individuals sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic153—essentially a “just pick two”
rule.154 Thus, the Marsh court allowed the plaintiff to maintain a sexplus discrimination claim as a woman who possessed a second immutable trait (her race) that contributed to discrimination against her.
Although the plaintiff was not seeking to include any factors in addition to race and sex, the court preempted this possibility altogether by
holding that a Title VII plaintiff could claim only one “plus.”155
The next year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Jefferies to aggregate racial and sexual hostility evidence.156 In Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co.,157 the court used a form of sex-plus analysis to
remand a case for determination on the role of racial discrimination in
a sexually harassing environment.158 The plaintiff, a black woman,
had been subject to sexual harassment and a flurry of racial slurs and
jokes.159 On appeal, the Hicks court held that Title VII prohibits
racial harassment and that the plaintiff should be permitted to use
evidence of racial and sexual harassment to prove a hostile work envition typically is conceived of in terms of white women and race discrimination is thought of in
terms of black men).
149 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
150 Id. at 780.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Levit, supra note 43, at 229.
155 Marsh, 649 F. Supp. at 780.
156 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir. 1987), aff’d on reh’g, 928
F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991).
157 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
158 Id. at 1416, 1419.
159 See id. at 1409–10.
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ronment claim.160 Citing Jefferies, the court held that disparate treatment of a sub-class of women constitutes a violation of Title VII.161
While sex-plus analysis is somewhat helpful in the intersectional
context, it still often relegates a Title VII-protected category to the
level of a plus factor. In this context, sex-plus analysis is a more
sophisticated version of articulating identity, but ultimately still a
facade for discrimination that is structured around one factor.162
Accordingly, sex-plus analysis ignores a central tenet of intersectionality—that where discrimination is based on two statutorily-protected
traits, each deserves equal consideration.163
Sex-plus analysis presents a second problem in that courts often
do not know what weight to assign the plus. This difficulty occurs
when the plus is an ostensibly neutral consideration, and becomes
more significant when the plus is a statutorily-protected trait.164 For
example, in Hicks the Tenth Circuit instructed the lower court to evaluate the racial slurs and jokes as part of the sexually harassing hostile
environment claim, but did not provide any guidance as to the relative
weight of the racial comments.165 This ambiguity over what weight to
assign the plus trait seems to track with the general confusion in
courts regarding how to evaluate the components of an intersectional
claim.166
The Marsh court’s “just pick two” rule167 exemplifies a third
problem with the sex-plus doctrine because an intersectional claimant’s “plus” is often immediately exhausted. This is especially true for
women of color who, in order to make a claim that involves both race
160

Id. at 1416–17.
Id. at 1416.
162 Castro & Corral, supra note 63, at 168–69.
163 As one commentator has stated:
Had the Jefferies court viewed Black women as a distinct class under Title VII, who
should be given protection because sex and race are both prohibited categories, the issue
of sex-plus and what constitutes a “plus” could have been avoided. Instead, the issue
would have been whether persons of ‘like qualities [are] given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex’ and race, rather than allowing the focus to shift to arbitrary sexplus limits.
Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1472 (emphasis in original).
164 In this context, giving the plus trait any less weight than the primary protected characteristic (i.e., sex) seems to fall short of the protection Congress intended individuals to have
under Title VII. See Ghassomians v. Ashland Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp. 2d 675, 687–88 (E.D.
Ky. 1998).
165 Wei, supra note 63, at 780.
166 See infra notes 220–24, 232–35 and accompanying text.
167 See Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986); Levit, supra note 43, at 229.
161

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912592

2006]

INTERSECTIONALITY

AND

IDENTITY

223

and sex, must use their race as the plus factor.168 They are then left
without the protection they may potentially need under the pluses of
being pregnant, married, or single with children.169 Conversely, a
white woman will not need to identify her race as a plus (to make a
claim that involves both her sex and race), given society’s tendency to
consider “white” the norm.170
Most fundamentally, the oppression a black woman encounters is
more than merely the addition of the racism black men experience
and the sexism white women face.171 Consider the following scenario:
Assume that a corporation requires its applicant to sit for oral interviews in which they are subjectively rated on qualities such as “fits the
corporate profile,” “leadership potential” or “ability to project a commanding presence.” Also assume that African American women disproportionately fail the interview while African American men and
white women score exceptionally well. In such a case, it would seem
that stereotypes of African American women have disadvantaged
them as a distinct group. Understood in this manner, compound discrimination claims are not reducible to either of the contributing factors (e.g., race or sex) but are instead attributable to the combined
effects of both.172

Intersectional scholars have vehemently rejected the oversimplification that, for instance, a black woman is simply the sum of “woman”
+ “black.”173 In this context, the whole is clearly greater than the sum
of its parts. Whereas antidiscrimination doctrine, at best, treats multiplicity as a combination of yellow and blue tennis balls in a bucket,
168

Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1472.
Id.
170 Id. (observing that a white woman’s race, unlike that of a black woman, is generally not
considered a plus factor because of society’s tendency to normalize whiteness).
171 This type of additive analysis has been criticized as a site of erasure. See Crenshaw,
supra note 18, at 1252; SPELMAN, supra note 29, at 115.
172 Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil
Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787, 835 (1994).
173 See generally Crenshaw, supra note 7; Grillo, supra note 47; Harris, supra note 40; Mari
J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1992); SPELMAN, supra note 29. See also Adrien Katherine Wing,
Reno v. Am.-Aide Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 573 (2000) (arguing the multiplicity of experience “cannot be reduced to
an addition problem: ‘racism + sexism = straight black woman’s experience’ ”).
169
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intersectionality aspires to treat identity more like paint.174 In mixing
yellow and blue paint, one is left with something altogether new—a
shade of green. In the context of identity, the result of “mixing” different traits is that an entirely unique set of “concerns and characteristics” emerges.175 For black women, this means that race and sex
discrimination “come together to reinforce and, by particularizing,
reshape each other.”176 This particular synergy is illustrated by the
array of stereotypes black women have encountered historically.
These stereotypes—such as “nigger bitch” or “buffalo butt”—embody
a unique merger of racism and sexism that black men or white women
will probably never face.177
To be clear, sex-plus analysis does have an important role in
employment discrimination: to protect against discrimination on the
basis of non-statutorily-protected categories used as proxies to discriminate on the basis of sex. As one commentator has noted, sexual
harassment or discrimination is no less actionable or typical when it
takes on a more particularized focus.178 Rather, “the stigmatization of
attractive women or blue-collar women or assertive women or pregnant women is in many cases simply animus toward women expressing—and often camouflaging—itself by conforming to the
characteristics of a particular target.”179 Accordingly, if courts decide
to limit the number of pluses a plaintiff may utilize—as the Marsh 180
court did—statutorily-protected categories should not count toward
this number. Courts should only use the “plus” concept to consider
discrimination based upon factors that are not expressly protected by
Title VII.181
F. Hostile Work Environments
Intersectionality has also arisen in cases dealing with claims of
hostile work environments.182 For example, in Brooms v. Regal Tube
174

Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 265–66.
Id.
176 Abrams, supra note 24, at 2532.
177 Id. at 2501.
178 Id. at 2538.
179 Id.
180 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
181 Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1475–76.
182 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2000). The Supreme Court has determined that this
175
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Co.,183 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a Title VII violation for sexual
harassment, but refused to hear the plaintiff’s racial harassment claim.
The plaintiff was a thirty-six year old industrial nurse who repeatedly
experienced sexual and racial harassment.184 This exploitation
culminated when her supervisor showed her a picture of black women
performing acts of bestiality and told her this was how she “was going
to end up.”185 Her supervisor then grabbed her arm and threatened to
kill her.186 Ms. Brooms threw her coffee on him and ran away, shrieking and falling down a flight of stairs.187 Although the Seventh Circuit
declined to hear the racial harassment claim under an unrelated rationale, the court should have at least commented on it in its discussion
of the Title VII claim—especially since the harassment was extremely
racial.188
Some courts have not viewed the sexual harassment of black
women so narrowly. As discussed earlier, the Hicks 189 court aggregated racial and sexual harassment evidence.190 Although the black
female plaintiff lost her claims at the trial court level, the Tenth Circuit declared that she should have the option to “aggregate evidence
of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility.”191 Of course, this
implicit affirmation of the plaintiff’s intersectional claim may be partly
attributable to the plaintiff’s greater emphasis on the intersectional
nature of her claim.192
prohibition’s scope is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. Harris v. Forklift Sys.
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Rather, discrimination that is so “severe or pervasive” as to “alter
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment” violates Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). The Court observed
that ever “[s]ince the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] Guidelines were issued,
courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”
Id. at 66.
183 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
184 Id. at 416–17.
185 Id. at 417.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 The evidence includes her repeated subjection to racial slurs and exposure to racist
pornography that depicted black women in demeaning positions. Id. at 416–17.
189 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991).
190 See id. at 1416; supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
191 Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416.
192 In fact, emphasis by the plaintiff seems to be critical for courts to give an intersectional
claim of discrimination the amount of attention it deserves. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 2500
(noting that Hicks is an example of a case where “black women plaintiffs have placed more
emphasis on the intersectional character of their claims”).
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On the whole, Hicks has produced unpredictable progeny.193
Most courts use Hicks for the proposition that a plaintiff may aggregate all evidence of illegal discrimination to support a hostile work
environment claim—even if the evidence, disaggregated, would not
support an outright claim of discrimination. For example, in Hafford
v. Seidner,194 the plaintiff was an African-American Muslim, who
alleged a hostile work environment on the basis of race and religion.195
Although the Sixth Circuit found the evidence for his religious discrimination claim insufficient, it allowed him to use the evidence to
support his racial hostile work environment claim.196 The court noted
that the essential element of a hostile work environment is that the
cumulative effect of ongoing harassment is abusive.197 The Hafford
court cited Hicks to reason that denying judgment for a plaintiff
where the total harassment experienced is abusive would be unfair
even though the separate bases for the harassment claim, standing
alone, would not amount to severe or pervasive harassment.198 Other
courts have not only allowed, but insisted, that plaintiffs receive intersectional evaluation with regard to hostile work environment
claims.199
More recently, in Domb v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim included allegations of discrimination on the bases of religion, gender, and national origin.200
The defendant treated each type of discrimination as separate hostile
work environment claims, under the assumption that separate proof
for each type was required.201 The court cited Lam 202 and Jefferies 203
as proof that multiple bases for discrimination often “cannot be neatly
193

Id. at 2500.
183 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1999).
195 Id. at 515.
196 Id. at 514–15.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 515 (claiming the district court should allow the aggregation of racial and religious
discrimination evidence in considering whether a hostile work environment existed).
199 In Stingley v. Arizona, the court noted that in harassment cases, hostility is properly
appraised from the plaintiff’s particularized perspective. 796 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D. Ariz. 1992).
Accordingly, the court observed this requirement may take on special meaning in the case of a
black woman. Id. at 428 n.8.
200 Domb v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13790 at *1, *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2003).
201 Id.
202 Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
203 Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
194
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reduced to distinct components.”204 The court then correctly
explained that the defendant had a single work environment made
hostile by every discriminatory remark.205 This explanation has analogous import for an intersectional claimant; in such a case, the intersectional plaintiff is one person who experiences discrimination by every
violation of Title VII. The upshot is that a plaintiff—in either a hostile environment or disparate treatment case—ought to be able to
aggregate proofs of discrimination.
Yet not all courts have accepted intersectional claims regarding
hostile work environments. In Clay v. BPS Guard Services,206 the
court manifested its reluctance to validate intersectional standing in a
hostile work environment case. In Clay, the plaintiff, a black woman,
sued her employer alleging discrimination on the basis of race.207 She
later amended her complaint to include allegations of sex discrimination.208 Ms. Clay claimed that she endured racial slurs, received a
break schedule different from white employees, and heard employees
and supervisors characterize blacks as “those who liked to live off welfare because they are lazy.”209 Additionally, she was consistently
referred to as “nigger bitch.”210
The defendant argued the plaintiff’s allegations of sex discrimination should be dismissed or stricken since the plaintiff failed to file a
sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”).211 The court noted that the standard for
allowing these claims (of race and sex discrimination) to proceed was
whether they were “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the
charge and growing out of such allegations.”212 In other words, the
claims of sex discrimination would be cognizable if they emanated
from the original race discrimination claim. The court further noted
that this “reasonably related” standard should be construed liberally
204

Domb, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13790 at *1, *18.
Id.
206 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1993).
207 Id. at *2.
208 Id. at *2–*3.
209 Id. at *3.
210 Id.
211 Id. at *6.
212 Clay, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399 at *7 (quoting Perera v. Flexonics, Inc., 727 F. Supp.
406, 412–13 (N.D. Ill. 1989)) (emphasis added).
205
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“to effectuate the remedial purposes of Title VII, which itself depends
on lay persons, often unschooled, to enforce its provisions.”213
The court decided that the plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination allegations must be dismissed.214 Even construing the
EEOC’s report liberally, the court stated the sexual discrimination
claims were not sufficiently “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge [of race discrimination] and growing out of such
allegations.”215 The Clay court determined that the plaintiff’s proof
for her race discrimination claim—that the defendant employed a
white female—clearly contradicted the plaintiff’s claim of sex
discrimination.216
But did this observation truly contradict the plaintiff’s allegation
of sex discrimination? Is sex discrimination only directed at white
women? Once again, the court failed to see that evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment of white women is not exculpatory as to a black
woman claiming discrimination on the basis of both race and sex.217
Accordingly, the court failed to appreciate the inextricable relation
between race and sex for a black woman. Indeed, there are specific
stereotypes associated with black women that made Ms. Clay’s sexual
discrimination claim reasonably related to her claim of racial discrimination. For example, “nigger bitch” is a term unlikely to ever be
assigned to a black man. Such a term exemplifies the confluence of
sexual and racial discrimination.218 As Professor Abrams notes,
“terms like nigger bitch or buffalo butt are unlikely to ever be used
against either black men or white women; they convey a kind of
racialized sexual hostility, or sexualized racial hostility that cannot be
disaggregated into its component parts.”219
Professor Abrams’ observation raises another shortcoming of
courts, even of those willing to aggregate more than one type of evidence: by emphasizing aggregation of evidence, courts imply that discrimination against intersectional claimants should be understood as
213

Id. (quoting Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Id. at *9.
215 Id. at *9 (quoting Perera, 727 F. Supp. at 412–13).
216 Id.
217 Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980); see
supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
218 Abrams, supra note 24, at 2538 (noting that courts resolving such a case “must specify
that terms such as nigger bitch reflect both race and gender discrimination”).
219 Id. at 2501.
214
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an additive phenomenon.220 As discussed above, this type of analysis
misses the point regarding intersectional claimants.221 Racial and sexual harassment should be treated as additive only insofar as either
type, if proven, would support recovery.222 But it must be
remembered that such traits are also interactive, intersectional, and
often arise in situations that would have no import for white women
or black men.223 The failure by courts to explicate these intersectional
dynamics has caused not only unnecessary losses for plaintiffs, but
also reluctance by many claimants to plead racial and sexual
harassment.224
III.

A MODEST PROPOSAL

There are a few distinct reasons why intersectionality has failed to
take hold, despite its logical application and obvious appeal for plaintiffs. While persons with potential intersectional claims are ubiquitous, intersectionality is the legal claim that, proverbially speaking, is
hidden in plain sight. That said, there are some simple solutions that
would help considerably to bring intersectionality into the open and
increase its viability within the court system.
A. Why Are There Still So Few Intersectional Claims?
Although a number of recent cases seem to provide glimpses of
hope for intersectional claimants, there remains a great deal of work
to be done. There are at least three factors at work that are disabling
wider acceptance of the intersectional approach.225
First, attorneys have stymied intersectional claims by failing to
recognize compound discrimination.226 In the domestic violence con220

Id. at 2501–02.
See supra Part II.E (explaining how additive analysis of intersectional claimants misses
the unique concerns, stereotypes, and characteristics of those individuals).
222 Abrams, supra note 24, at 2538.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 2501–02.
225 The majority of circuits have not addressed intersectionality. For example, there are
only two published opinions that cite Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectionality thesis. See B.K.B.
v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551,
1562 n.20 (9th Cir. 1994).
226 This was one of the principle findings of a major study on sex and age discrimination,
which analyzed claims of older women brought over a twenty-year period. Kimberlie K. Ryan,
Compound Discrimination: Closing the Loop in Age and Sex Claims, 28 COLO. LAW. 5, 6 (1999).
Though age is protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, not Title
221
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text, Sarah Buel observes that “counsel generally ignore the significant issues implicit in the intersectionality of violence, gender, race
and class.”227 She notes that they are often “unable to comprehend
. . . context, nuances and complexity . . . .”228 This point is critical
because one cannot expect judges to do the job of lawyers. Accordingly, lawyers must guide the courts with properly pleaded and fully
explained intersectional claims.229 The Lam 230 model, in particular,
provides an excellent conceptual framework for articulating
intersectionality.231
Second, in those limited cases where an intersectional claim is
proffered, judges and juries often struggle to appreciate the permutations and harms of an injury that is both racial and sexual.232 Consequently, courts have not achieved an adequate conceptual construct
for examining discrimination on multiple grounds.233 This failure is
demonstrated by the tendency of courts to default to sex-plus analysis,
instead of giving equal consideration to a plaintiff’s race and sex.
Given this lack of understanding and concomitant tendency by judges
VII, such a discovery is illustrative of the tendency of attorneys to conceptualize identity as
fundamentally discrete.
227 Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law: Situating Domestic Violence
Work in Law Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 309, 311 (2003).
228 Id.
229 Wei, supra note 63, at 807. Wei later notes:
Clearly, intersectional claims will not succeed unless they are properly pleaded and wellargued. Plaintiffs’ attorneys must be sure to recognize the intersectionality of factors and
must not limit the description of their clients’ reality by channeling discrimination into a
single category when it most likely cannot be fully attributed to race, sex or national
origin exclusively. If attorneys present claims based on a single factor they will encourage
courts to evaluate their clients under standards that oversimplify their experiences.
Id. at 811 (citing Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing a Korean-American woman who experienced intersectional discrimination and filed a Title
VII claim based on national origin discrimination only)).
230 Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994).
231 See supra notes 119–28 and accompanying text; Wei, supra note 63, at 811 (arguing that
attorneys should follow the Lam model when pleading intersectional claims to place the theory
within Title VII’s common jurisprudence).
232 Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 188 n.22 (2001). This struggle is
evident in numerous cases which sidestep the difficult questions surrounding intersectional
claimants. See, e.g., Fang-Hui Liao v. Dean, 658 F. Supp. 1554, 1561 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (holding
that “there is no need for this court to determine whether or not TVA’s decision to terminate
Dr. Liao was impermissibly or directly motivated by her race and/or her sex” since the employer
had violated its own affirmative action program).
233 Wei, supra note 63, at 779.
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to dismiss intersectional claims, women of color have had little hope
in obtaining help from the judiciary.234 Accordingly, such judicial
ignorance and bias have engendered a general distrust regarding the
legal system in would-be female litigants of color.235
Third, given the small number of intersectional cases that actually
make it to the pages of a court’s opinion, there is very little precedent
available for comparison. Accordingly, an attorney contemplating an
intersectional claim has only a small number of cases to guide her to a
successful resolution for her client. Therefore, many attorneys may be
unable to discern how the court will decide such an issue and may shy
away from bringing the claim in the first place. Unfortunately, nothing can uncover the number of intersectional claims that never get
brought in the first place.
These three factors work in concert to perpetuate each other.
Attorneys fail to recognize intersectional discrimination and therefore
fail to adequately present intersectional claims. This failure, in turn,
undermines the prospect that judges will seize upon persuasive intersectional claims and deliver favorable rulings. Finally, without valuable precedent from appellate courts, attorneys continue to fail to
perceive and advance intersectional claims for multiply-burdened
plaintiffs. Hence, some practical solutions are in order.
234 See id. (noting that empirical counts of cases brought by women of color are uncertain
due to judges’ tendency to dismiss intersectional claims). Also, a recent study examining California employment discrimination concluded, in part, that women and plaintiffs of color bringing
such cases have extremely low success rates in federal court. See NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
WOMEN & FAMILIES, WOMEN AT WORK: LOOKING BEHIND THE NUMBERS 40 YEARS AFTER
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 16 (2004) (citing David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter:
An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511 (2003)).
For example, in race discrimination cases brought by non-whites, plaintiffs succeeded only 36%
of the time. Id. Notably, of the race discrimination cases brought by whites, plaintiffs won 100%
of the time. Id. The lowest success rates were found to lie at the intersection of race and gender,
and race and age. Id. In cases brought by African-American women alleging race and/or sex
discrimination, plaintiffs won only 17% of the time. Id. Such findings support the conclusion
that intersectional prejudice remains among the strongest of judicial biases.
235 Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender
Bias in the Justice System 547 (2003), available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/
BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). Accordingly,
[l]itigants report that courts do not understand their cultural backgrounds and that this
leads to misunderstandings that may compromise their cases. . . . Several judges discussed
the gap in experience and understanding between middle-class Caucasian judges and poor
minority litigants. One judge characterized it as judges living in an ‘ivory tower’ of uppermiddle-class biases.
Id. at 548.
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B. Administrative Solutions
The EEOC should issue guidelines instructing judges how to deal
with intersectional claimants. These guidelines should address a number of issues. First, they should emphasize that formulaic attempts to
situate identity fall short. Conceptually, this includes, for example,
understanding that an Asian woman’s plight cannot be reduced to the
observation that she is “woman” + “Asian.” As illustrated earlier,
there are often very specific stereotypes and sociocultural labels
pinned to particular groups that prevent such facile equations.236
Avoiding such equations requires courts to be sensitive to different groups’ or claimants’ historical, social, and economic experiences.237 Courts should draw upon these groups’ experiences when
reaching decisions that concern them, just as the Supreme Court
acknowledged the sociohistorical experiences of white women and
black men in its Frontiero v. Richardson 238 opinion. This type of attention by courts and the EEOC guidelines would increase various
groups’ visibility and educate others about membership in these
groups.239 At the same time, courts must resist the tendency to formulaically assume that every time a woman of color, for example, brings
a discrimination claim, it must have intersectional overtones. Courts
must be open to intersectional claims, but must not force a plaintiff
into an intersectional class when her claim is brought under only one
protected category.240
Second, the EEOC guidelines should explain that even though a
black woman might utilize evidence of discrimination against blacks
or women to effectively persuade a court, evidence of an employer’s
nondiscrimination against the two groups that bisect an intersectional
claimant’s identity is unpersuasive. As explicated earlier, the evidence
does not work both ways.241
Third, the guidelines should assure courts that intersectional
standing is not infinitely regressive. A court is not obliged to recog236

See supra notes 171–77, 218–19 and accompanying text.
Scarborough, supra note 65, at 1474.
238 Id. at 1474–75 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
239 Id. at 1475. These groups might include Indian, Hispanic, and Asian women; women
and men of color from other countries; and women of various religions—Jewish women, Muslim
women, and Hindu women.
240 Mary Elizabeth Powell, Comment, The Claims of Women of Color Under Title VII: The
Interaction of Race and Gender, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413, 436 (1996).
241 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
237
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nize the intersection of all the traits that comprise one’s identity. In
fact, intersectionality originated as a push for courts to recognize the
confluence of race and sex in the case of black women. As a guidepost, it is reasonable for courts to recognize the confluence of two or
more of any of the statutorily-protected traits under Title VII. These
traits—race, sex, color, religion, and national origin—prevent intersectionality from becoming the Pandora’s box that would result from
attempting to recognize all traits related to one’s identity.242
Finally, the EEOC guidelines should elucidate that recognizing a
compound discrimination claim is not an undeserved privilege or
“super-remedy.”243 Recognizing intersectional claims does not give
Hispanic women, for instance, any greater redress than Hispanic men
or white women.244 Nor does it make discrimination easier to prove.
A plaintiff must still prove that discrimination on the basis of statutorily-protected traits accounted for the treatment she received. Recognizing an intersectional claim merely allows a plaintiff to more clearly
articulate her unique experiences by using evidence from all the (statutorily-protected) groups that intersect to constitute her identity.245
As one federal court noted, the plaintiff, claiming national origin
and sexual harassment, could prove her claim by showing evidence
that the employer would not have harassed her “but for the fact that
242 The DeGraffenreid court first articulated this fear with its concern that allowing black
women to bring their claims as “black women” would open “the hackneyed Pandora’s box.”
DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977). And indeed, some have argued
for a version of intersectionality that does seem infinitely regressive. Elvia Arriola has argued
that intersectionality fails to recognize that a victim of discrimination “might be not just black,
but also, for example, [L]atina, aged, disabled, poor, or lesbian.” Arriola, supra note 79, at 129.
Peter Kwan, a post-intersectional scholar, has articulated a similar proposition—that we must
move beyond intersectionality because of its inability to deal with “the underclass single mother
butch [b]lack lesbian who files a job discrimination lawsuit against her employer.” Peter Kwan,
Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 686 (2000)
(emphasis added). Both authors persuasively illustrate that expanding Title VII to include
unlisted traits such as sexual orientation may have real merit. However, for those who worry
about infinite regress, Title VII and its list of protected traits provide express limits for the
current application of intersectionality.
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DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
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Wei, supra note 63, at 808–09.
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Id. “The duty not to discriminate is owed each minority employee, and discrimination
against one of them is not excused by a showing the employer did not discriminate against all of
them, or there was one he did not abuse.” Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (quoting Furnco v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
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she is a woman or a person of Persian national origin or both.”246 It is
fair to allow this breadth of evidence since the plaintiff was not only
fully woman and fully Persian, but also fully a Persian woman. These
evidentiary recommendations seem sensible given that the Supreme
Court has claimed Title VII’s purpose is to remove all unnecessary
barriers to employment “when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.”247
C. Amending Title VII
Given the current confusion among courts and the EEOC’s failure to provide clarity regarding intersectional claims, one promising
response to the intersectional dilemma would be a congressional
amendment to Title VII. One beneficial aspect of this solution is its
simplicity. Congress could clarify the “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin” language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by adding the
phrase “or any combination thereof” at the end.248 This solution
would expressly allow cases that allege discrimination based upon
more than one category to proceed without forcing the plaintiff to
choose among the distinct categories explicit in the statute. This
amendment’s lack of verbiage and consistency with legislative history
would likely aid in its passage.
These aforementioned changes, if realized, would represent
piecemeal progress in an area of law still clouded with confusion by 1)
making express Congress’s intent to allow intersectional claimants to
proceed under more than one legally-protected category, and 2)
addressing how courts should enforce the aggregation of evidence of
discrimination that is based on more than one statutorily-protected
category.
246 Ghassomians v. Ashland Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp. 2d 675, 687 (E.D. Ky. 1998)
(emphasis added).
247

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 421, 431 (1971) (emphasis added).
Castro & Corral, supra note 63, at 172 (proposing that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) should
read: “It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin or any combination thereof”); Wei, supra note 63, at 811 (observing that
Asian women are left without sure means of redress for intersectional violations absent a statutory amendment rendering the factors listed in Title VII expressly inclusive).
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CONCLUSION
The myriad ways a person’s identity is constructed and daily
reconstructed is a complex phenomenon. Accordingly, the true motivation for why a person discriminates against another is often quite
complicated. Intersectionality provides one means of addressing this
complication by providing recourse when the basis for discrimination
is a conflation of more than one legally-protected characteristic. In
such a context, intersectionality illuminates the need to consider each
of the protected characteristics that intersect to constitute a person’s
identity. Such an approach to discrimination may help uncover intersectional groups that have been lacking full recourse to their discrimination claims for years.
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